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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff-Respondent 
Management Services Corporation ("Management Services"), pur-
chaser, against Development Associates ("Development Associates"), 
seller, for the alleged breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated December 7, 1976 ("the contract"), wherein Management 
Services agreed to purchase eight (8) lots in the Daybreak 
Phase III Subdivision for $80,000.00. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Peter F. 
Leary, sitting without jury, held that the contract was 
divisible; that Management Services defaulted with respect 
to an installment payment of $19,800.00 due on or before 
March 1, 1977; that Development Associates properly forfeited 
Management Services' interest in two of the eight lots pur-
chased under the contract; and that Development Associates 
wrongfully terminated the contract with respect to the 
remaining six lots. The Court awarded judgment to Management 
Services on its Third Cause of Action for the amount of 
$7,700.00 in lost profits; $2,438.00 lost commissions; 
$600.00 in earnest money; and attorney's fees in the amount 
of $1,850.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Development Associates seeks reversal of the Court's 
judgment in favor of Management Services, together with 
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reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Development Associates 
in the defense of this action. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
On December 7, 1976, Management Services entered 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Development Associates 
for the purchase of eight (8) lots in the Daybreak Phase III 
Subdivision in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 129, 266). The 
following language appears on the face of the contract: 
"2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for 
the consideration herein mentioned agrees 
to sell and convey to the buyer, and the 
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned 
agrees to purchase the following described 
real property, situate in the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, to-wit: More 
particularly described as follows: 
Lots #309, #310, #311, #312, #313, #314, 
#315, #316 Daybreak Phase III Subdivision 
as recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorders 
Office. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter 
into possession and pay for said described 
premises the sum of Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000.00) payable at the office of Seller, 
his assigns or order 307 W. 200 S., SLC, 
Utah 84101 strictly within the following 
times, to-wit: Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, and the balance of $79,200.00 
shall be paid as follows: 
Beginning March 1, 1977, buyer to 
complete payment on two (2) lots 
($19,800.00) and thereafter to close 
two (2) lots on the first of each 
month. Total amount to be paid on 
or before June 15, 1977. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered 
to buyer on the 7th day of December, 1976." 
(R. 9, 10). 
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The contract does not specifically state which 
particular lots Management Services intended to pay for on 
March 1, 1977 or any subsequent month (R. 9). 
Management Services never made the $19,800.00 
payment which was due on or before March 1, 1977. On 
March 19, 1977, Development Associates caused a contract 
forfeiture notice to be served upon Edward A. White ("Mr. 
White"), President of Management Services (R. 4, 11). On 
March 25, 1977, Development Associates received a letter 
from Management Services dated March 23, 1977, signed by 
Mr. White, President, stating in part as follows: 
"(2) We are ready to take title to 
lots 311 and 312 immediately. The 
funds are now in escrow at Western 
States Title Insurance Co. for Lot 
311. The funds will be deposited 
with them immediately for Lot 312 
upon their notification that they 
have all of the closing documents 
ready." (R. 13, 251). 
Paragraph 16 of the contract provides in part 
that in the event Management Services fails to comply with 
the terms of the contract, or upon their failure to make 
payments when due or within fifteen days thereafter, 
Development Associates has the option to be released from 
all obligations in law and equity upon Management Services' 
failure to remedy the default within five days. The contract 
further provides that all payments made by Management Services 
prior to that time would be forfeited to Development Associates 
as liquidated damaoes for non-performance of the contract (R. 10). 
-3-
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Mr. White was very familiar with real estate trans-
actions generally, having been involved in the real estate 
business either as an agent or broker since 1961 (R. 153). Mr. 
White further testified that between 1961 and 1976, he had 
participated in at least two or three hundred transactions 
involving Uniform Real Estate Contracts similar to the one 
here at issue (R. 154, 155). Indeed, shortly before Management 
Services filed this action against Development Associates, Mr. 
White was a party in another action wherein default was alleged 
under Paragraph 16 of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Mr. 
White testified that he was thoroughly familiar with the 
language of Paragraph 16 and the basic idea of forfeiture 
(R. 155, 156). 
Development Associates refused to accept the conditior.s] 
imposed by Mr. White in his response to the contract forfeiture 
notice; deemed Management Services' interest in the subject 
lots forfeited; and retained $800.00 in earnest money as 
liquidated damages. Management Services subsequently commenced 
this action, seeking title to the eight lots in question, or 
in the alternative, damages for breach of contract. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO 
BE "ENTIRE" AND THAT ANY DEFAULT WOULD 
APPLY TO ALL EIGHT LOTS 
The pivotal issue in this appeal is primarily an 
issue of law and can be stated as follows: Did the trial 
-4-
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court err in concluding that the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated December 7, 1976 was a "divisible" contract? More 
specifically, did Management Services default with respect 
to all eight lots, or, as the trial court concluded, just 
"the first two lots"? 
An analysis of the general rules regarding divisibility 
or severability of contracts is appropriate. 
"No formula has been devised which 
furnishes a test for determining in all 
cases what contracts are severable and 
what are entire. The primary criterion 
for determining the question is the 
intention of the parties as determined 
by a fair construction of the terms and 
provisions of the contract itself, by 
the subject matter to which it has 
reference, and by the circumstances of 
the particular transaction giving rise 
to the question. Whether a contract is 
entire or divisible cannot be determined 
by a single term, phrase, or sentence, 
even though it is broad enough to include 
such meaning, unless, throughout the 
whole agreement and from the surrounding 
circumstances, it definitely appears 
either that it was or that it was not 
the intention of the parties that the 
contract should be entire and indivisible. 
If, in this respect, the parties themselves 
have placed a certain construction on the 
contract, that is to be considered, and 
acts of the parties in treating the con-
tract as entire or severable have an 
important bearing on its construction. 
A factor in determining whether a contract 
is entire or severable is whether the 
parties reached an agreement regarding 
the various items as a whole or whether 
the agreement was reached by regarding 
each item as a unit. A contract to do 
several things at several times is 
divisible in its nature if there is no 
manifestation of a contrary intent. 
Obviously, however, if the intention 
is expressly stated in the contract, 
-5-
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there is no room for construction. 
A contract may, both in its nature and 
by its terms, be severable and yet be 
made entire by the intention of the 
parties. 
As a means of ascertaining the 
intention of the parties, various 
tests have been adopted. According 
to some authorities, the criterion is 
to be found in the question whether the 
quantity, service, or thing as a whole 
is of the essence of the contract. If 
it appears that it is to be performed 
only as a whole, the contract is entire. 
Thus, the best test is said to be whether 
all of the things, as a whole, are of 
the essence of the contract: that is, if 
it appears that the purpose is to take 
the whole or none, the contract is entire; 
otherwise, it is severable. Another 
test supported by a number of authorities 
is that a contract is entire when, by 
its terms, nature, and purpose, it 
contemplates that each and all of its 
parts are interdependent and common to 
one another and to the consideration, 
and is severable, when, in its nature 
and purpose, it is susceptible of divi-
sions and apportionment, and has two 
or more parts in respect to matters or 
things contemplated and embraced by the 
contract which are not necessarily 
dependent upon each other. Still another 
test that has been suggested is the 
possibility or impossibility of a certain 
apportionment of benefits, according to 
the compensation in the contract, in 
case of part performance only. 
* * * 
In construing a contract to determine 
whether it is entire or severable, many 
of the courts have regarded the singleness 
or apportionability of the consideration 
as an important test--that is, if the 
consideration is single, the contract is 
entire, but if the consideration is 
expressly or by necessary implication 
apportioned, the contract is severable. 
Thus, where several things are to be done 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
under a contract, and the money consider-
ation to be paid is apportioned to each 
of the items, the contract is ordinarily 
regarded as severable. On the other hand, 
if the consideration to be paid is single 
and entire, the contract will ordinarily 
be held to be entire, although the subject 
thereof may consist of several distinct 
and wholly independent items. The prin-
ciple by which the courts are governed 
when they declare that a contract about 
several things but with a single consider-
ation in gross is entire and not severable 
is that it is impossible to affirm that 
the party making the contract would have 
consented to do so unless he had supposed 
that the rights to be acquired thereunder 
would extend to all the things in question. 
However, the singleness or apportionability 
of the consideration, although important, 
is only one of the essential facts to be 
considered, and will not necessarily 
prevail over other factors, or provisions 
of the contract, indicating a contrary 
intent. 
* * * 
An agreement which embraces a number 
of distinct subjects that admit of being 
separately executed and closed is, as a 
general rule, to be taken distributively 
or severally as to each subject. A contract 
is severable where the part to be performed 
by one party consists of several distinct 
and separate items and the price to be paid 
by the other is apportioned to each item 
or is left to be implied by law. But this 
method of determining whether a contract 
is entire or severable will not override 
the clear intention of the parties, if 
such intention can be gathered from the 
whole subject matter of the contract. While 
the severable nature of the subject may 
often assist in determining the intention, 
it will not overcome the intent to make 
an entire contract when that is shown. 
Ultimately, the entirety of a contract 
depends upon the intention of the parties, 
and not upon the divisibility of the subject 
or the number of distinct subjects. 
-7-
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* * * 
The fact that a contract calls for 
performance in instalments does not 
necessarily make it a divisible contract. 
Whether such a contract is divisible or 
entire generally depends upon the intention 
of the parties ascertained by a construction 
of the contract. A provision in an entire 
contract for payment in instalments, which 
instalments are not referable to severable 
items or portions of the performance but 
are referable to the performance of the 
whole, does not render or characterize 
such contract severable. Although, in 
some cases, contracts to pay for work in 
instalments have been declared to be 
severable, there are many others in which 
such contracts have been held to be entire 
and indivisible. 
Similar principles control with regard 
to whether a contract in which the compen-
sation is fixed at a certain amount per 
unit of work done is entire or severable. 
Whether such a contract is entire or 
severable depends upon the intention of 
the parties as ascertained from a construc-
tion of the contract as a whole and also, 
where it is necessary in order to determine 
that intention, from the surrounding 
circumstances. Applying these principles 
the courts in some cases have reached the 
conclusion that the contract being con-
strued was entire, and in others that it 
was severable." 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, 
Sections 325-328 at pages 758-763 (emphasis 
added) 
In Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973), this Court upheld as 
"entire" the lower court's construction of a lease agreement a~ 
separate option, observing as follows: 
"In attempting to overturn the 
trial court's ruling that the lease and 
the "Added Option" were intended to be 
one integrated transaction the defendant 
argues for application of the principle 
-8-
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that if the two agreements can be 
segregated and carried out separately, 
that should be done. The soundness of 
that doctrine in appropriate fact 
situations is not doubted. But the 
trial court appears to have been con-
cerned with other basic principles of 
contract law, which have more specific 
application to the instant fact situation. 
The most fundamental of these is that the 
meaning and effect to be given a contract 
depends upon the intent of the parties, 
and that this is to be ascertained by look-
ing at the entire contract, and all of its 
parts in their relationship to each other; 
and this principle applies to whether they 
intended separate aspects of their contract 
to be severable, and that if this results in 
uncertainty, he may and should look to 
extraneous evidence concerning the back-
ground and surrounding circumstances in 
order to make that determination." 
515 P. 2d at 448. (emphasis added) 
Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho 337, 399 P.2d 635 (1965) 
is an action by vendors for breach of a contract to convey several 
lots to vendee at $2,000.00 each, three lots of which would later 
be reconveyed from vendee to vendor for $1,500.00 each. The 
contract also involved several agreements, one of which was that 
vendor should make certain off-site improvements on the lots, such 
as sidewalks, curb and paving, irrigation pipe, and water pipe, 
before a given date. In his motion to dismiss on grounds that 
seller failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, 
buyer filed an affidavit stating that on the date of the contract, 
buyer had been and was married, and that all property acquired 
by him became community property. The trial court treated the 
motion as one for summary judgment and dismissed the action. On 
appeal, the issue of severability arose in conjunction with the 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issue of whether buyer, as a married person, could be con-
strained to reconvey the three lots in question since after 
the initial conveyance they became community property of him 
and his wife. Because she was not a party to the contract, 
claimed by buyer, the clause of the contract requiring recon-
veyance of the lots could not be upheld. 
In reversing and remanding the case, the Idaho Supr~e 
Court stated that apportionment of consideration was a question 
to be resolved but that this was only one factor to be considered 
in the divisibility question. 
"A contract may both in its nature and by 
its terms be severable and yet rendered 
entire by the intention of the parties. 
We think that perhaps the best test is 
whether all of the things, as a whole, 
are of the essence of the contract. That 
is, if it appeared that the purpose was to 
take the whole or none, then the contract 
would be entire; otherwise, it would be 
severable. Wooten v. Walters, 110 N.C. 251, 
14 S.E. 734, 736. 
The divisibility of the subject matter, 
or the apportionment of the consideration, 
while they are both items to consider in 
determining whether a contract is entire 
or severable, are not conclusive." 399 P.2d 
at 641. 
Analyzing the facts of the instant case in light of 
the rules of law applicable to divisibility of contracts, the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract here at issue clearly requires 
Management Services to purchase lots 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 
314, 315, and 316 of the Daybreack Phase III Subdivision for 
$80,000.00 (R. 3). Although the language of the contract 
speaks for itself, both Mr. White and Marvin A. Kirkham, Vice 
-10-
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President of Development Associates, testified that Management 
Services agreed to purchase eight lots in the Daybreak Phase 
III Subdivision: 
Q. (By Mr. Scott) I'm showing you here 
what's marked as Exhibit Plaintiff's 
2, would you identify that document 
please? 
A. (By Mr. White) Yes. It's a Uniform 
Real Estate contract dated December 7th, 
1976 wherein Management Services Corporation 
agrees to purchase eight lots in Daybreak 
III Subdivision from Development Associates. 
Q. And what was to be the purchase price on 
those lots? 
A. The purchase price was to be $10,000 per 
lot. 
Q. And the contract totalled $10,000 per lot 
or $80,000? 
A. $80,000. 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Scott) Okay. Now, could I refer 
you to Paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Well, before I do, now 
it's my understanding from your testimony--
and please correct me if I'm wrong--that 
under this Uniform Real Estate Contract you 
were to sell eight lots to Ed White; is 
that correct? 
A. (Mr. Kirkham) We agreed to convey eight--
Q. Management Services? 
A. --eight lots to Management Services 
Corporation upon their payment. 
Q. And they were to pay $80,000? 
A. Total payment. (R. 129, 266) 
-11-
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In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court held: 
"2. Plaintiff defaulted with respect to 
the purchase of the first two lots, payment 
for which was due in March of 1977, thereby 
forfeiting all of his right, title and interest 
therein. 
3. Defendant wrongfully terminated the 
contract with respect to the remaining 
six lots which were to be paid in full 
by plaintiff in April, May and June of 
1977." (R. 100). 
A careful analysis of the language of the contract, 
trial transcript, depositions, and pleadings in the instant 
case reveals the true intent of the parties and the inconsisten~ 
of the trial court's conclusion that the contract was divisible. 
Paragraph 3 of the contract states: 
"3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter 
into possession and pay for said described 
premises the sum of Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000.00) payable at the office of Seller, 
his assigns or order 307 W. 200 s., SLC, 
Utah 84101 strictly within the following 
times, to-wit: Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) . 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledg~. ' 
and the balance of $79,200.00 shall be paid 
as follows: 
Beginning March 1, 1977, buyer to 
complete payment on two (2} lots 
($19,800.00) and thereafter to close 
two (2) lots on the first of each month. 
Total amount to be paid on or before 
June 15, 1977. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered 
to buyer on the 7th day of December, 1976. 
If in fact plaintiff defaulted with respect to the purchase of 
the first two lots, a finding which Management Services did not 
appeal, the "first two lots" listed in the contract are lots 
-12-
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309 and 310. The undisputed fact is, however, that Management 
Services did not intend to "close" lots 309 and 310 on or before 
March 1, 1977, as evidenced by Mr. White's letter dated March 23, 
1977: 
2) We are ready to take title to Lots 311 
and 312 immediately. The funds are now in 
escrow at Western States Title Insurance 
Co. for Lot 3311. The funds will be deposited 
with them immediately for Lot 312 ~pon their 
notification that they have all of the 
closing documents ready. (R. 13). (emphasis 
added) 
It is also clear from the record that the reason for 
allowing Management Services to take title to any two lots upon 
payment of $19,800.00 on or before March 1, April 1, May 1 
and June 1, 1977, was because Mr. White intended to make all 
the contract installment payments with proceeds from the sales 
of the lots (Depo. of Mr. White at 23). If the parties had 
not agreed that Management Services would receive title to any 
two lots upon payment of $19,800.00 when due, title to all eight 
lots would have remained in Development Associates because of 
the following language which appears in Paragraph 19 of the 
contract: 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments 
herein reserved to be paid at the time and 
in the manner above mentioned agrees to 
execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, 
a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying 
the title to the above described premises 
free and clear of all encumbrances except as 
herein mentioned* * * (R. 10). 
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
Development Associates knew which were the first two lots 
-13-
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Management Services intended to close until March 25, 1977, 
twenty-five days after payment was due, and seven days after 
the contract forfeiture notice was served upon Management 
Services (R. 11-13). For these reasons, the lower court should 
have concluded that Management Services defaulted with respect 
to all eight lots, not just "the first two lots". 
What the lower court accomplished by its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in the instant case was 
to rewrite the contract in favor of Management Services. But, 
as the Idaho Court observed in Boesiger, supra, "* * * by 
enforcing less than the whole, the Court imposes upon the 
parties a contract to which they would not have assented, and 
which in all likelihood they would not have voluntarily made. 
The Court should not infringe the freedom of contract by 
construction." 399 P.2d 641 (citation omitted). 
Development Associates respectfully submits that by 
severing the contract in the instant case, the lower Court 
imposed upon the parties a contract to which Development AssociaW 
would not have assented; that the judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed; and that Development Associates should be 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,485.00 
incurred in connection with the defense of this action (R. 276i. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts of the instant case reveal that 
Management Services agreed to purchase eight lots from DeveloprE 
-14-
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Associates for $80,000.00; that an instalment payment of 
$19,800.00 was due on or before March 1, 1977; that Management 
Services never made the payment; that a contract forfeiture 
notice was served upon Management Services March 19, 1977; 
that Mr. White's response to the contract forfeiture notice 
imposed conditions not contained in the contract and not con-
templated by the parties; and that the default was never 
remedied. Because the total purchase price for all eight 
lots was $80,000.00, and since the contract does not specifically 
designate which lots were to be closed on the dates the instal-
ment payments of $19,800.00 were due, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that Management Services defaulted with respect to all 
eight lots, not just "the first two lots". Therefore, the 
contract must be construed as "entire" rather than divisible, 
and the judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, YOUNG, PAXTON & RUSSELL 
By:"'$~~ 
Steven H. Stewart 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
220 South Second East, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were served upon the Respondent by mailing 
the same, postage prepaid, to Kent B. Scott of Senior & Senior, 
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Attorneys for Respondent, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 18th day of July, 1979. 
~~~~ 
Steven H~Stewart 
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